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Auditors’ Responsibility for Fraud Detection: New Wine in Old Bottles?
Lawrence Chui
Byron Pike*
Fraud is costly. According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examinations (ACFE),
an estimated $3.5 trillion worldwide were lost due to fraudulent financial statements, asset
misappropriation, and corruption in 2011 (ACFE, 2012). In the U.S. alone, the ACFE projected
an annual revenue loss of $994 billion due to fraud. These staggering losses represent
approximately 7% of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (ACFE, 2008; ACFE, 2009). Based on
the U.S. fiscal year 2011 budget, losses resulting from fraud exceeded the net costs of the
department of defense, homeland security, transportation, and education combined for fiscal year
2008. Fraud is not only costly, but it also damages the reputation and the credibility of the audit
profession. The loss of public trust seems justified when audited financial statements turn out to
be unreliable and must be restated due to fraud. As a result, the investing public is elevating its
expectations for auditors to detect fraud (Eillot and Jacobson, 1987; Hooks, 1991; Nicolaisen, D.
T., 2005; Silverstone and Davia, 2005; Hogan et al., 2008).
Accounting researchers, practitioners, and standard setters alike expressed concern for
auditors’ apparent failures in detecting fraud during an audit. Joseph T. Wells, founder of the
ACFE, criticized auditors for their lack of training and readiness in fraud detection. He contends
that “[a]s a group, CPAs are neither stupid nor crooked. But the majority are still ignorant about
fraud…for the last 80 years, untrained accounting graduates have been drafted to wage war
against sophisticated liars and thieves” (Wells, 2005b). Jamal (2008) agrees with Wells’
*The authors are, respectively, Assistant Professor at University of St. Thomas and Assistant Professor at
Minnesota State University, Mankato.
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sentiment by arguing fraud detection has become the audit profession’s Achilles heel. Even
convicted felons agree that auditors lack the ability to detect fraud. For instance, Sam Antar,
from the infamous Crazy Eddie case, made some insidious remarks on his website
(http://www.whitecollarfraud.com) about how easily he was able to deceive the auditors. He
remarked that as a general practice, “most large accounting firms use relatively inexperienced
kids right out of college to do basic audit leg work. They are supervised by slightly more
experienced senior auditors who unfortunately depend on feedback from these inexperienced
kids in making informed decision.” Antar further explained how he was able to corrode the
auditors’ professional skepticism as the auditors “did not want to believe we were crooks. They
believed whatever we told them without verifying the truth.”
In an effort to restore public trust in the audit profession, accounting standard setters have
increased the steps auditors are expected to take in order to detect fraud. As a result of the Enron
and WorldCom debacles, auditors are currently required to adhere to the requirements of
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99. Under the guidance of this standard, auditors are
required to participate in brainstorming sessions and consider the possibility that a material
misstatement due to fraud could be present (AICPA, 2002). Standard setters expected SAS No.
99 to increase auditors’ awareness of the prevalence of fraud during their audit engagements.
Despite the standard setters’ intentions to improve auditors’ abilities to detect fraud, the Public
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection team observed numerous instances where
auditors failed to appropriately implement SAS No. 99 (PCAOB, 2007). In addition to SAS No.
99, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) released a series of audit
risk standards (SAS Nos. 104 – 111) to help provide auditors guidance in regard to the risk
assessment process. Similarly, the PCAOB in August 2010 adopted a suite of eight auditing
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standards (AS Nos. 8 – 15) to enhance the effectiveness of auditors’ risk assessments. Daniel L.
Goelzer, PCAOB Acting Chairman, stated these standards are designed to promote sophisticated
risk assessments in audits and to minimize the risk that auditors fail to detect material
misstatements (PCAOB, 2010).
Though the PCAOB inspection report proves to be disappointing, its findings are not all
that surprising. For years, the ACFE reported only a small percentage of fraud cases were
uncovered by external audit. Hence, external audit may not be the most effective way to detect or
limit fraud (ACFE 2012; ACFE, 2010; ACFE, 2008; ACFE, 2006; ACFE, 2004; ACFE, 2002).
Financial statement auditors are not fraud examiners. They are trained to determine whether the
company’s financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Fraud detection, unlike a financial
statement audit, requires a unique skill set and forensic techniques developed for the sole
purpose of detecting the evidence of fraud (Davia, 2000). Specifically, the skill set and
techniques include applying investigative and analytical skills related to the areas of accounting
records, gathering and evaluating financial statement evidence, interviewing all parties related to
an alleged fraud situation, and serving as an expert witness in a fraud case (Hopwood et al.,
2008; Rosen, 2006; Singleton et al., 2006). Therefore, merely requiring auditors to be aware of
the possibility of fraud in a financial statement audit is not enough to detect fraud.
We observe a trend that standard setters often resort to issuing additional auditing
standards as a response to restore public trust after widely publicized frauds. However, time and
again, auditors appear to fail in fraud detection as the response of additional standards is
primarily symbolic in nature. We contend the failure in fraud detection is attributable to the
differences in skill sets and task objectives between financial statement auditing and fraud
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auditing. Although standard setters have gradually realized the need to involve forensic
specialists in a financial statement audit after a fraud risk factor has been identified, auditors
have not made much progress in fraud detection.
We propose it is necessary to integrate forensic specialists into all audit engagements to
reduce the risk of fraud. In addition, we believe it is of paramount importance to train financial
statement auditors in the area of forensic accounting and fraud auditing. Without proper and
adequate forensic training, expecting financial statement auditors to detect fraud is similar to
pouring new wine into old bottles. In order to better protect the public from fraud and to maintain
the credibility of the audit profession, it is necessary for accounting researchers to explore new
ways of improving auditors’ abilities to detect and limit fraud.
Our contribution to the literature consists of providing a synopsis of auditors’
responsibility for fraud detection and the standard setting progression. More importantly, we
provide a critical assessment of the profession’s reaction to fraud and identify the deficiencies in
auditors’ approaches for detecting fraud that still exists today. Through doing so, we utilize an
expert panel to demonstrate the demarcation between auditors and forensic specialists. Finally,
we make the contribution of proposing an audit model that could potentially overcome the
identified deficiencies.
In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the changes in auditors’ responsibility
for fraud detection over the years. We then highlight the differences between financial statement
auditors and forensic specialists. Finally, we conclude by identifying future actions and research
opportunities that can be used to improve auditors’ abilities to detect fraud.
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AUDITORS’ RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETECTING FRAUD
Shift in Audit Focus on Fraud Detection
Auditors’ responsibility for fraud detection has changed dramatically over the years.
Fraud detection was once the chief audit objective dating back to 1500 and beyond (Brown,
1962; Albrecht et al., 2001). Early British auditing objectives, which centered on the discovery
of defalcations, formed the basis of American auditing during its formative years when auditors
were taught that the primary objectives of an audit were to detect and prevent fraud and error
(Dicksee, 1909; Montgomery, 1921; Brown, 1962). The ability of auditors to detect fraud was
considered a virtue of the profession:
“The detection of fraud is a most important portion of the auditor’s duties, and there
will be no disputing the contention that the auditor who is able to detect fraud is – other
things being equal – a better man than the auditor who cannot. Auditors should, therefore,
assiduously cultivate this branch of their functions – doubtless the opportunity will not
for long be wanting – as it is undoubtedly a branch that their clients will most generally
appreciate.” (Dicksee, 1909, p. 23)

The emphasis on fraud detection gradually dissipated during the period from 1933 to
1940 (Brown, 1962; Albrecht et al., 2001). Long before the Enron debacle, the audit profession
was confronted with the infamous McKesson and Robbins scandal in late 1938.1 The McKesson
and Robbins scandal was “like a torrent of cold water” that “shocked the accountancy profession
into breathlessness” (Carey, 1939, p. 65). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
opened an investigation into McKesson and Robbins shortly after the massive fraud was
uncovered. McKesson and Robbins’ auditor, Price Waterhouse & Co, was under intense scrutiny
for its inability to detect and prevent the massive accounting fraud. In the aftermath of the
McKesson and Robbins scandal, auditors were required to perform additional audit procedures
1

McKesson and Robbins was a wholesale drug company acquired by F. Donald Coster in 1926. Coster and his
brothers ran an elaborate accounting scheme to inflate the company’s reported assets for more than a decade. By
1937, this translated into over $18 million of fictitious sales and $19 million worth of non-existent assets.
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on accounts receivable and inventories (Baxter, 1999). To limit potential liability exposure for
auditors, the audit profession came to the consensus that “auditor(s) could not, and should not, be
primarily concerned with the detection of fraud” (Brown, 1962, p. 700).
The change in the audit profession’s focus on fraud detection was reflected in the
Statement of Auditing Procedures (SAP) No. 1, Extension of Auditing Procedure:
“The ordinary examination incident to the issuance of financial statements
accompanied by a report and opinion of an independent certified public accountant is
not designed to discover all defalcations, because that is not its primary objective,
although discovery of defalcation frequently results…To exhaust the possibility of
exposure of all cases of dishonesty or fraud, the independent auditor would have to
examine in detail all transactions. This would entail a prohibitive cost to the great
majority of business enterprises – a cost which would pass all bounds of reasonable
expectation of benefit or safeguard there from, and place an undue burden on
industry.” (AICPA, 1939)
SAP No. 1 effectively shifted auditors’ foci away from fraud detection during an audit. Auditors
were instead concerned with determining the fairness of their clients’ reported financial
statements in accordance with the accounting standards (Brown, 1962). Subsequent to the
issuance of SAP No. 1, the audit profession came under mounting pressure from the public and
the SEC to clarify auditors’ responsibility with respect to fraud detection (Brown, 1962; Albrecht
et al., 2001). As a result, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued
SAP No. 30, Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor in the Examination of
Financial Statements in 1960. Although SAP No. 30 acknowledged that auditors should be
aware of the possibility fraud may exist during an audit, it was so negatively stated that auditors
felt little or no obligation to detect fraud (Scott and Frye, 1997; Albrecht and Willingham, 1993).
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The Cohen and the Treadway Commissions
The Equity Funding scandal was the next major fraud case that ultimately prompted
congressional inquiry about auditors’ failures in fraud detection (Treadway, 1987).2 In response
to the Congressional inquiry, the AICPA formed the commission on auditor’s responsibility,
commonly known as the Cohen Commission, to re-examine auditors’ responsibility to detect
fraud (Treadway, 1987; Albrecht and Willingham, 1993; Scott and Frye, 1997).3 The
Commission acknowledged that while auditors should be actively considering the potential for
fraud, the inherent limitation in the audit process dampened auditors’ responsibility for detecting
all material frauds. Specifically, the commission recognized it is difficult for auditors to detect
frauds that are concealed and derived from forgery or collusion by members of management.
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 16, The Independent Auditor’s Responsibility for the
Detection of Errors or Irregularities, was issued as a result of the Cohen Commission. SAS No.
16 implicitly acknowledged that auditors have a responsibility to search for frauds that may have
a material effect on a company’s reported financial statements. It also contained a list of red flags
auditors should consider when searching for financial statement fraud (Albrecht et al., 2001).
However, the language of SAS No. 16 was viewed as ambiguous as it did not provide adequate
guidance for auditors to search for fraud during an audit (Treadway, 1987; Madison and Ross,
1990).
Changes in Federal regulations during the 1970s also dampened auditors’ senses of
obligation to detect fraud. As the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission

2

The Equity Funding scandal involved the booking of fictitious receivables and income to inflate earnings per share
in order to beat earnings expectations. Equity Funding sold insurance to fictitious customers by selling phony
policies. Although there were sufficient red flags to cause auditors to be more skeptical, they missed the ongoing
fraud. Equity Funding’s auditors missed 64,000 phony transactions with a face value of $2 billion, $25 million in
counterfeit bonds, and $100 million in missing assets (Hancox, 1997).
3
The commission was led by former SEC chairman, Manuel F. Cohen.
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(FTC) pressured professional organizations to “eliminate elements of their codes of professional
behavior that the government deemed to violate federal anti-trust statues,” the FTC wanted the
AICPA to allow audit firms to engage in unrestricted advertising (Kinney, 2005, p. 91). Under
unrelenting pressure, the AICPA lifted its ban on “competitive bidding, the prohibition on
advertising, and the ban on contingent fees and commissions for nonattest clients” from the
professional code of conduct (Windsor and Warming-Rasmussen, 2007, p. 3). As a result of the
removal of the AICPA’s ban on competitive bidding for audit services, the profits margins of
auditing narrowed significantly among the big audit firms. Stephen A. Zeff claimed he recalled
hearing a senior practitioner state “the worst thing a Big Eight partner can possibly do these days
is to lose a client over a matter of principle” (Zeff, 1987, p. 67). The FTC’s mandate to increase
competition in the audit profession not only fundamentally changed the relationship between
auditors and their clients, but it also increased cost pressure and subsequently affected audit
quality in the years to come (Kinney, 2005). Toby Bishop, former president of the ACFE,
contended competitive bidding placed tremendous pressure on audit firms to limit hours in an
audit engagement. He argued that such action inadvertently discouraged auditors to look for
fraud during an audit (as cited in Weil, 2004).
By the mid-1980s, it was obvious that SAS No. 16 was insufficient and auditors’
unwillingness to accept increased responsibility to detect fraud was increasing the expectation
gap (Albrecht and Willingham, 1993).4 The public expects auditors to detect all financial
statements fraud; however, auditors’ failures in fraud detection continue to widen the expectation
gap. This widening comes as a result of several publicized business failures, characterized by
some as audit failures (Scott and Frye, 1997). One in particular, the savings and loan crisis
4

The expectation gap is the difference between auditors’ performances and public expectations of their
responsibility.
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during the mid-1980s, created a new wave of public concern and Congressional inquiry which
eventually led to the formation of the Treadway Commission (Glover and Aono, 1995). The goal
of the Treadway Commission was to “identify causal factors that can lead to fraudulent financial
reporting and steps to reduce its incidence” (Treadway, 1987, p. 1). One of the main purposes of
the Treadway Commission was to:
“Examine the role of the independent public accountant in detecting fraud, focusing
particularly on whether the detection of fraudulent financial reporting has been neglected
or insufficiently focused on and whether the ability of the independent public accountant
to detect such fraud can be enhanced, and consider whether changes in auditing standards
or procedures – internal and external – would reduce the extent of fraudulent financial
reporting.” (Treadway, 1987, p. 2)
The Treadway Commission further asserted “the ability of the independent public accountant to
detect fraudulent financial reporting is related directly to the quality of the audit” (Treadway,
1987, p. 54). Nevertheless, the commission cautioned that although it is important to increase
auditors’ awareness of financial statements fraud, the investing public ought not to expect that
fraudulent financial reporting will be completely eradicated (Treadway, 1987).
Based on the commission’s review of fraudulent financial reporting cases, at least 36
percent of the cases involved auditors’ failure to recognize, or to pursue with sufficient
skepticism, certain fraud-related warning signs or red flags that existed at the time the audit was
conducted. The commission believed if auditors had been more diligent in investigating these red
flags, the fraudulent activity would have had a greater likelihood of being uncovered (Treadway,
1987). In 1988, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) issued nine statements of auditing
standards (SASs) based on the Treadway Commission’s report. These standards (Nos. 53 to 61)
were designed to clearly outline the external auditor’s role concerning fraud and enhance the
overall audit procedures for detecting and preventing fraud (Glover and Aono, 1995). Two of
these pronouncements, SAS No. 53 and No. 54, dealt specifically with congressional concerns
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about the detection of financial fraud and the potential illegal activities of audit clients (Madison
and Ross, 1990). Unlike prior standards, auditors were required to apply professional skepticism
to assume management is neither honest nor dishonest (Albrecht and Willingham, 1993).
However, in the early 1990s the Public Oversight Board (POB) recognized these new
SASs had little impact on the way audits were conducted, as they did not help to reduce liability
lawsuits against auditors. The POB also found that auditors neither consistently complied with
these standards nor applied the proper degree of professional skepticism required to detect fraud
(POB, 1993). There was a widespread public belief that while auditors have a responsibility to
detect fraud, they were neither willing nor capable of doing so. Mounting criticisms on the audit
profession over its failure to detect fraud prompted the POB to propose a number of
recommendations to improve auditors’ willingness to detect fraud. The POB asserted auditors
must accept responsibility for fraud detection. Nevertheless, the POB emphasized “the
profession cannot, and it cannot be expected to, develop methods that will assure that every
fraud, no matter how cleverly contrived, will be unearthed in the course of the audit, but it must
develop means of increasing significantly the likelihood of detecting fraud” (POB, 1993, p. 41).
In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) to
discourage abusive lawsuits due to fraudulent financial reporting. Among its provisions, the
PSLRA codified auditors’ existing responsibilities to search for and disclose fraud (Andrews and
Simonetti, 1996). Nevertheless, researchers argued the PSLRA alone was not sufficient to curb
financial statements fraud as any litigation reform acts need to work in unison with other
mechanisms to help detect and prevent fraud (Dyck et al., 2010).
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Increased Fraud Detection Responsibility and SAS No. 99
The AICPA supported the POB’s recommendations and concluded it was crucial to
develop an auditing standard focused solely on financial statement fraud (Mancino, 1997). The
AICPA formed a fraud task force and subsequently issued SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud
in a Financial Statement Audit, in February 1997. For the first time, fraud was included in the
title of an auditing standard. SAS No. 82 classified fraud into two distinct categories: intentional
falsification of financial statements and theft of assets. It provided auditors with a list of risk
factors covering instances of fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets that
they should assess during an audit. Under SAS No. 82, auditors must document their assessment
of fraud risk and their modifications to the audit plan if and when conditions of potential fraud
appear during the audit. SAS No. 82 was the AICPA's attempt to clarify auditors’ role in fraud
detection. The intention of the standard was to provide assurance to the public that when external
auditors signed their names to an opinion finding a company’s financial statements free of
material misstatements, they have taken extensive steps to ensure they did not overlook any
underlying fraud (Demery, 1997). Nevertheless, SAS No. 82 did not increase auditors’
responsibility to detect fraud beyond the key concepts of materiality and reasonable assurance
(Mancino, 1997).
In addition to the issuance of SAS No. 82, the POB appointed a panel to conduct a
comprehensive review of audit effectiveness at the request of the SEC. In 2000, the panel issued
its report and recommended auditors perform forensic-type procedures on every audit to enhance
the likelihood of detecting material financial statement fraud.5 The panel further recommended
audit firms use forensic specialists to provide auditors with fraud-related training (POB, 2000).
5

According to the panel, these forensic procedures range from conducting surprise inventory or cash counts to
performing substantive tests directed at the possibility of fraud (POB, 2000).
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However, none of these efforts appeared to be adopted by firms and did not prevent the waves of
fraud and earnings restatements that rocked the nation at the turn of the 21st century. Restating
firms lost over $100 billion in market capitalization between 1997 and 2002 (Coffee, 2003). The
public was outraged about the fall of Enron, the seventh largest company in the U.S. at the time
of its demise. Thousands of Enron employees lost their life’s savings when their pension plans
were depleted as a result of Enron filing for bankruptcy (Klass, 2004). The audit profession came
under heavy criticism for failing to carry out its fiduciary duty as gatekeepers who protect the
public’s interest. In an attempt to restore public confidence, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX) and created the Public Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Standard setters
expected SOX, which is considered the strongest regulation passed since the 1930s, to help
auditors prevent and limit corporate fraud (Klass, 2004).
In 2002, SAS No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, was issued
to replace SAS No. 82 and provide auditors with better guidance on how to enhance their
abilities to detect fraud during a financial statement audit. The purpose of the standard is to help
auditors take a proactive approach to prevent and detect fraud by increasing their knowledge of
their clients, which should result in more meaningful risk assessment procedures (Marczewski
and Akers, 2005; Kiel, 2008). SAS No. 99 calls for auditors to maintain a questioning mind
regarding the potential for material misstatements due to fraud throughout the audit. They are
expected to exercise professional skepticism in gathering and evaluating audit evidence and to
set aside prior beliefs that management is honest and has integrity. More specifically, it requires
auditors to engage in brainstorming sessions to discuss the risks of material misstatements due to
fraud (AICPA, 2002). Additionally, SAS No. 99 recommends audit firms use forensic specialists
to provide auditors with forensic audit training. While the intent of SAS No. 99 is to improve
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auditors’ performances related to fraud detection, auditors did not anticipate it would
substantially affect audit effectiveness (Marczewski and Akers, 2005; Gogin and Johnson, 2008).
The above discussion demonstrates that auditors’ responsibility for fraud detection has
changed significantly over time. Table 1 presents a timeline of major scandals and subsequent
audit changes that impacted the relationship between auditors and fraud detection.
TABLE 1. Timeline of Major Scandals and Subsequent Audit Changes
Major Scandal – 1930s



The McKesson and Robbins scandal

Subsequent Audit Changes
– 1930s to 1960s




The issuance of the Statement of Auditing Procedures (SAP) No. 1,
Extension of Auditing Procedure
The issuance of the Statement of Auditing Procedures (SAP) No. 30,
Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor in the
Examination of Financial Statements

Major Scandal – 1970s



The Equity Funding scandal

Subsequent Audit Changes
– 1970s to 1990s



The formation of the Cohen Commission to investigate the
expectation gap and auditors’ responsibility in detecting fraud during
an audit
The issuance of the Cohen Commission’s report
The issuance of the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 16,
The Independent Auditor’s Responsibility for the Detection of Errors
or Irregularities
The formation of the Treadway Commission to identify causal
factors that can lead to fraudulent financial reporting and steps to
reduce its incidence
The issuance of the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 53,
The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect Errors and Irregularities
The issuance of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
The issuance of the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82,
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
The formation of a Public Oversight Board panel to conduct a
comprehensive review of the effectiveness of the auditing








Major Scandal – 2000s



The Enron scandal

Subsequent Audit Changes
– 2000s to present





The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The formation of the Public Accounting Oversight Board
The issuance of the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99,
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
AICPA released series of risk suite – SAS No. 104 – 111
PCAOB adapted eight risk auditing standards – AS Nos. 8 – 15
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Whether or not auditors should be responsible for fraud detection remains both as a
philosophical and a policy issue that is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, the
relationship between auditors and fraud detection has changed dramatically since the inception of
the American audit profession. By the late 1930s, the audit profession “refused to accept primary
responsibility” for detecting fraud in a financial statement audit (Costello, 1991, p. 267). In fact,
as additional fraud standards were issued, auditors failed to wholeheartedly embrace the
additional responsibility and procedures to actively search for and detect fraud. It appears
auditors have maintained the attitude that they should not be responsible for and are not the best
equipped to provide assurance regarding the presence of fraud. However, as the audit profession
has been plagued by numerous corporate frauds, it is forced to find ways to improve auditors’
considerations of fraud during a financial statements audit. While there are no auditing standards
that can provide absolute assurance in detecting all fraud, the audit profession has demonstrated
a commitment to improve auditors’ abilities in fraud detection through the issuance of various
fraud-related standards over the years. Nevertheless, the question remains whether or not the
progression of fraud-related auditing standards has better equipped auditors for fraud detection
and increased their propensity in detecting fraud, which would ultimately provide greater
assurance to the users of financial statements.
AUDITORS ARE NOT FRAUD DETECTORS
Recent research has shown forensic specialists outperform financial statement auditors in
fraud-related tasks (Rose et al., 2009; Bortiz et al., 2008). Although auditors appear to exhibit a
lack of sensitivity in discerning the telltale signs of fraud, they are in no way inferior to forensic
specialists in terms of their education, training, experience, and professionalism. In actuality,
there are many commonalities between financial statement auditors and forensic specialists. Both
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are required to maintain a high degree of independence and objectivity; to be innovative; to
avoid having any preconceptions and biases when evaluating evidence; to have in-depth
knowledge of GAAP as well as general business practices and processes (Bologna, 1984).
Although financial statement auditors and forensic specialists share similar characteristics, the
primary difference that separates them is their mission. Auditors’ primary objective is to examine
whether the company’s reported financial statements, taken as a whole, are stated fairly in all
material respects in conformity with GAAP. Their goal is to provide reasonable assurance that
these statements are free from material misstatements (AU Section 110). Alternatively, forensic
specialists’ primary objective is to make an absolute determination about the existence and
source of fraud by gathering and evaluating evidence and interviewing all parties related to an
alleged fraud situation (Davia, 2000; Silverstone and Davia, 2005; Rosen, 2006; Singleton et al.,
2006; Singleton and Singleton, 2007; Hopwood et al., 2008).
Gerson et al. (2006) offered a simple analogy to help illustrate the differences between
these two professions by likening financial statement auditors to patrolmen and forensic
specialists to detectives. Similar to auditors, patrolmen circulate through their assigned districts
with the objective of keeping peace in the community. Ideally, patrolmen would like to
continuously patrol through every location in their districts, however, it would be both time and
cost prohibitive for them to do so. Thus, to remain effective, patrolmen have to balance risk and
expectations in order to determine whether to focus or expand their patrols. Unlike patrolmen,
detectives do not go on patrol. They are tasked to investigate whether a crime has been
committed. To successfully accomplish their task, detectives would examine everything in the
alleged crime scene to gather any clues that may help them solve the case. Crime investigation is
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a time consuming and costly endeavor as detectives are expected to keep searching and piecing
different clues together until they solve the crime.
Recall, both the POB and SAS No. 99 encouraged the use of forensic specialists in
conducting all audits. However, no evidence to date suggests firms have adopted these proposals.
In 2004, the PCAOB Standing Advisory Group (SAG) recommended a series of fraud-related
discussion questions as an effort to increase the likelihood of discovering fraud in an audit
(PCAOB, 2004). Among the questions raised by the SAG was whether forensic specialists
employ a different mindset than financial statements auditors. We constructed a panel of experts
with the aim of validating and discerning the differences between auditors and forensic
specialists as identified in the literature and to ascertain the question posed by the SAG. We
selected various professionals to serve on our expert panel based on Bologna and Lindquist’s
(1987) criteria, which includes the experts’ credentials, licensure, and certification, as well as
writings and publications from his or her field of expertise. Our panel consists of four audit
experts and five forensic specialists. See table 2 for the credentials and background of our
experts.
TABLE 2. Expert panel
Expert Background
Partner from a Big 4 firm with 10 years of forensic experience and is Certified in Financial
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Forensics (CFF)
Forensic services director from a Big 4 firm with 10 years of forensic experience and is a
Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE)
Forensic services manager from a second-tier firm with 4 years of forensic experience and is a
CFE
Risk advisory manager from a regional firm with 8 years of forensic experience and is a CFE
Professor and director of forensic services in a major university with 10 years of forensic
experience and is a CFF
Audit partner from a Big 4 firm with 15 years of audit experience and is a CPA
Audit partner from a second-tier firm with 40 years of audit experience and is a CPA
Audit manager from a second-tier firm with 8 years of experience and is a CPA
Audit manager from a second-tier firm with 7 years of experience and is a CPA
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We conducted our interviews with these experts via conference calls and face-to-face
conversations. We explained the nature of our research to the experts and we asked them to
comment on whether the differences between auditors and forensic specialists that we have
observed from the literature were an adequate representation of their respective professions.
Specifically, we asked our experts several open-ended questions regarding the role, objective,
and expectations, as well as the thought process of an auditor and a fraud specialist. We
summarized the interview comments from our experts in Table 3. Below are selected comments
that were provided to us by our experts. To avoid applying our own value judgments, we used no
materiality or weighting standard in our choices of these quotations.
“…unlike fraud specialists, auditors are only looking for material misstatements in the financial
statements.”
“Because of the general misconception in the marketplace about the role of financial statement
auditors in fraud detection, there are certain procedures that auditors will do to specifically
address fraud risks that go beyond the risk-based approach on material accounts. A typical
procedure here would be the review of journal entries. However, these are not our primary
objectives and testing procedures.”
“Fraud specialists generally do not work with a materiality level and given today’s technology
capabilities it is reasonable for a fraud specialist to examine 100% of a data set of transactions.”
“The requirement to obtain reasonable assurance regarding the detection of material
misstatements is the same regardless of whether the misstatement results from unintentional error
or from fraud; hence, financial statement auditors have no specific requirements to find fraud
although SAS 99 requires us to perform fraud-specific procedures.”
“Financial audits tend to be procedural driven and linear. Fraud audits tend to be about the
mindset, and tend to be cyclical such as finding evidence, evaluating evidence, revising
procedures, finding more evidence, evaluating, revising, etc. Financial audits tend to be quite
similar, especially from year to year or within the same industry. Fraud audits tend be like
snowflakes, each one takes on its own personality.”
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TABLE 3. Expert panel interviews summary
Auditor

Fraud Specialist

Role and objective as an auditor
The primary responsibility of an auditor is to gather
documentation to determine whether the company’s
reported financial statements taken as a whole
(including footnotes) are stated fairly, in all material
respects, in conformity with Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP).

Role and objective as a fraud specialist
The primary responsibility of a fraud specialist
is to determine whether fraud exists, regardless
of its size or magnitude. The fraud specialist
also has the responsibility to determine the
overall extent of fraud (if it exists), how it
occurred and how the risk of its future
occurrences can be reduced or prevented.

Expectations for an auditor
Auditors would be asked to look at their clients’
accounts either individually or in aggregate with other
accounts. They would especially focus on accounts with
a reasonable possibility of containing a material
misstatement.

Expectations for a fraud specialist
Fraud specialists would be asked to examine
either a single account or a single transaction
to see if fraud exists. They may also be asked
to look at a series of transactions since fraud
may not necessarily occur in a single
transaction.

Auditors work with a materiality level and they are
primarily concerned with material matters in an audit.
Materiality is relevant to them because it serves as a
guide to their evaluation of audit evidence.

Fraud specialists do not work with a
materiality level and they are not concerned
with the concept of materiality. Materiality is
irrelevant to them because fraud may often
occur below the materiality level.

Auditors would not be expected to examine every
transaction and they would generally rely on audit
sampling.

Fraud specialists would be expected to
examine everything in great depth and they
would generally not rely on audit sampling.

Auditors would not be concerned with minor
discrepancies in any single account. They would only
be concerned if these discrepancies are indicative of
larger or pervasive problems.

Fraud specialists would be concerned with any
minor discrepancies. They would assess these
discrepancies to understand their nature and to
determine if they are indicative of fraud.

Auditors would generally have a predetermined time
budget for work. If they spend too much time
examining one area, they may have to spend less time
somewhere else or they may run the risk of going over
budget. While time is of the essence in an audit,
auditors still have to do a sufficient amount of work and
should not intentionally reduce or eliminate a
procedure.

Fraud specialists would generally not be driven
by a fixed budget. They would examine their
work and review certain findings at the end of
each phase. This will give them the
opportunity to assess whether additional work
is required. Fraud specialists may request more
time and resources for their investigation until
they are satisfied with their assessment of
whether fraud exists.
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Auditors’ thought processes
Fraud specialists’ thought processes
Auditors think about accounting records in terms of the Fraud specialists think about accounting
availability of supporting documents and the
records in terms of the authenticity of the
authenticity of the audit trail. They have to decide
events and activities that are behind the
whether there is valid documentation to support the
reported transactions. They have to evaluate
recorded transactions and whether they are presented in whether these transactions actually took place
conformance with Generally Accepted Accounting
and are consistent with other information in
Principles (GAAP).
their investigation.
Auditors are required to maintain an appropriate level
of professional skepticism by having a questioning
mind when they are evaluating audit evidence. They are
encouraged to consider risk factors relating to
fraudulent financial reporting that include motive,
opportunity, and rationalization.

Fraud specialists are expected to be sensitive
to, and on the lookout for, the warning signs of
fraud. To discover fraud, it is important for
fraud specialists to be able to think like a thief
by asking themselves how they would probe
and exploit any weaknesses of a company.

Auditors are encouraged to keep in mind that the
possibility that a material misstatement due to
unintentional error or fraud could be present, regardless
of their belief about their client’s honesty and integrity.

Fraud specialists are mindful that a visible
immaterial misstatement may appear to be
inconsequential, but the hidden portion of the
misstatement could be substantial.

Overall, our experts agreed there is a substantial difference between financial statement
auditors and forensic specialists in terms of their responsibilities and task objectives. Financial
statement auditors are expected to examine their clients’ accounts either individually or in
aggregate with other accounts. They are expected to focus on accounts with a reasonable
possibility of containing a material misstatement. Auditors primarily work with a materiality
level that serves as a guide to their evaluations of audit evidence. The implication of materiality
is considered so that auditors do not become overly concerned with minor discrepancies in any
single account, unless these discrepancies are indicative of larger or pervasive problems. Given
that they have a predetermined time budget for their work, auditors understand that if they spend
too much time examining one area, they may have to spend less time somewhere else or run the
risk of going over budget. While time is of the essence in an audit, auditors understand it is vital
to do a sufficient amount of work and should not intentionally reduce or eliminate a procedure.
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In addition, auditors are not expected to examine every transaction and would generally rely on
audit sampling.
On the other hand, our experts indicated forensic specialists are typically called in to
examine whether fraud exists in either a single account or a single transaction. They may also be
asked to look at a series of transactions since fraud may not necessarily occur in a single
transaction. Unlike auditors, forensic specialists do not deal with a materiality level. Materiality
is irrelevant to forensic specialists because fraud often occurs below the materiality level.
Similarly, forensic specialists would assess all discrepancies (whether major or minor) to
understand their nature and to determine if they are indicative of fraud. They are expected to
examine everything in great depth and would generally not rely on audit sampling. In addition,
forensic specialists are typically not driven by a fixed time budget. They examine their work and
review certain findings at the end of each phase to assess whether additional work is required.
They may request more time and resources for their investigation until they are satisfied with
their assessment of whether fraud exists.
Our experts acknowledged auditors’ concerns with materiality and time budgets often
hinder their abilities to detect fraud. In general, all of the experts confirmed to us that there is a
vast difference between financial statement auditors and forensic specialists in regard to their
training as well as their effectiveness in fraud detection. The experts agreed that without proper
and adequate forensic training, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for auditors to uncover
fraud in a financial statement audit. This perhaps helps to explain why the ACFE has found a
deteriorating trend in external auditors’ abilities in detecting fraud despite the emphasis and
focus on fraud detection. The ACFE found the majority of fraud cases were detected by tips
rather than through external audit (ACFE, 2012; ACFE, 2010; ACFE, 2008; ACFE, 2006;
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ACFE, 2004; ACFE, 2002). Figure 1 depicts the percentage of fraud cases uncovered by external
audit as compared to tips from 2002 through 2012.

Fig. 1 Percentage of Fraud Cases Uncovered by External Audit and by Tips
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CONCLUSION
Our review of the changes in auditors’ responsibility for fraud detection has shown
standard setters have a tendency to issue additional auditing standards as a response to widely
publicized fraud cases. On the same note, auditors have been reluctant to take on additional
responsibility for detecting and providing assurance regarding the presence of fraud. In fact, as
additional fraud-related audit standards are issued, auditors tend to minimize their impacts and
fail to incorporate the provisions of the standards (PCAOB, 2007). Nevertheless, standard setters
and the audit profession have demonstrated a consistent commitment to improving auditors’
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fraud detection performances. Unfortunately, no audit standard can provide absolute assurance
that auditors can detect all fraud (Wells, 2004a). Moreover, despite the efforts put forth by the
profession, auditors are generally poor at detecting fraud.
Currently, SAS No. 99 is the law of the land in regards to how auditors should perform
procedures to detect fraud within the financial statements. Empirical evidence indicates the
percentage of fraud cases uncovered by external auditors has diminished in recent years (ACFE,
2012; ACFE, 2010; ACFE, 2008; ACFE, 2006; ACFE, 2004; ACFE, 2002). We contend the
failure in fraud detection is not a reflection of auditors’ lack of commitment in carrying out their
audit task. Nor can the failure be attributed to inadequacy in the current fraud audit standards.
Rather, we believe the failure of auditors is one of execution.
SAS No. 99 takes a red flags approach to fraud detection. That is, auditors, within the
current audit methodology, are expected to obtain a detailed understanding of their audit client.
Through doing so, auditors are to identify risk factors, especially pertaining to fraud. Once a
fraud risk factor is identified, auditors are expected to modify their audit programs to perform
detailed audit procedures to search for the presence of fraud (AICPA, 2002). This approach for
detecting fraud derived from the perpetration of numerous fraudulent cases despite the existence
of warning signs for auditors to detect. The failure in this model is individuals with expertise in
forensic accounting/fraud auditing are brought onto the engagement only upon the identification
of fraud by financial statement auditors. Thus, there is a mismatch between auditors’ training and
skills and what is required of them within SAS No. 99. Prior literature and our expert panel
confirmed our belief that there is a vast difference between financial statement auditors and
forensic specialists. In particular, auditors appear to exhibit a lack of sensitivity in discerning the
telltale signs of fraud, or the red flags that are necessary to be identified within the current fraud
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model. Moreover, typical audit firms provide little to no forensic training on how to uncover
fraud in a financial statement audit. As a result, it is our conjecture that frauds will continue to go
undetected by auditors unless there is a fundamental change to the current audit model.
To improve auditors’ fraud detection abilities, we believe it is necessary to integrate
forensic procedures and forensic specialists in all audit engagements. That is, for every audit
engagement there should be at least one individual on the audit team who can be classified as a
forensic specialist. Moreover, this individual needs to be present during the entire audit
engagement, rather than either providing limited input or being called into the engagement once
fraud is detected. We concede that this proposal could fail as a result of the additional cost
burden related to such a requirement. Therefore, at the very minimum, we believe it is of
paramount importance to train financial statement auditors in the areas of forensic accounting
and fraud auditing. With such training, auditors’ propensities to correctly identify and investigate
fraud-related red flags should increase, resulting in a greater probability that more fraud will be
detected by external audits as well as more confidence in auditors’ abilities to protect the
interests of stakeholders.
In order to better protect the public from fraud and to maintain the credibility of the
audit profession, accounting researchers must continue to explore ways that can help improve
auditors’ abilities to detect and to limit fraud. We urge accounting researchers to develop fraudresearch programs or studies by examining a series of questions posed by the PCAOB (see
Appendix A for the categories of questions raised by the PCAOB). As stated previously, one of
the questions raised by the PCAOB’s Standing Advisory Group was whether forensic specialists
employ a different mindset than financial statements auditors. Comments from our panel of
experts provided evidence to support the notion that forensic specialists do indeed have a
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different mindset than financial statements auditors. Using an experiment, Chui et al. (2012)
found individuals with a fraud specialist mindset made higher fraud risk assessments; were less
likely to evaluate the company’s accounts as fairly presented; and were more likely to take
further investigation action to examine the company’s accounts than those with the audit
mindset. These results provide preliminary empirical evidence to suggest it is possible to
increase auditors’ awareness of fraud by priming them with a fraud specialist mindset. Decision
aids typically have positive effects on the quality of cognitive processing (Bonner, 2007). Thus,
we believe it would be beneficial for accounting researchers to explore possible decision aids
that would help auditors to adapt to the fraud specialist mindset and to increase the likelihood of
auditors identifying red flags and uncovering fraud during an audit.
Fraud is costly and it is often a moving target. Auditors are not fraud specialists and there
are fundamental differences between financial statements audit and fraud examination.
Nevertheless, the prevalence of fraud requires that auditors be vigilant when considering the
possibility of fraud during the financial statements audit. It is important for us as a profession to
continue the pursuit of finding ways to incorporate forensic training and procedures into an audit
as a means to improve auditors’ fraud detection performances.
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APPENDIX A
Categories of Fraud-related Questions by the PCAOB Standing Advisory Group
Categories
 SAS No. 99
 Risk and Fraud Risk Factors
 Revenue Recognition related
 Significant or Unusual Accruals
 Related Parties
 Estimates of Fair Value
 Analytical Procedures
 Quarterly Financial Information
 Journal Entries
 Discussions with the Audit Committee
 Detection of Illegal Acts
 Forensic Accountants in an Audit of Financial Statements
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